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Abstract
This paper investigates how government transparency depends on
economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies,
in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the ex-
ogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this
information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication:
even if transparency is ex-ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it is
not an equilibrium whenever distortions are sufficiently high. We next
confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly
power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions.
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1 Introduction
Many governments are better informed than the private sector about future
realizations of macroeconomic variables.1 Often they transparently convey
this information to the public, but at other times they do not. For instance,
the US government’s announcements on current or future activity have a
positive real effect on the economy, confirming the fact that individuals find
them informative.2 In contrast, the widespread skepticism on contemporary
Argentine or Greek official statistics provides an example of non transparent
and non credible government announcements. While there may be different
opportunistic reasons for governments not to be transparent, in the present
paper we investigate whether a benevolent government would always reveal
its private information on real macroeconomic variables. For the sake of con-
creteness, we focus on the case in which the government has prior information
on exogenous aggregate productivity shocks that produce uniform positive
(in booms) or negative (in recessions) shifts in productivity. Would a benev-
olent government always fully reveal this information? Is it efficient to do
so? What are the determinants of government information transparency?
In an otherwise perfectly competitive, first best economy a benevolent
government would always reveal its private information. But, in a second best
world with unavoidable distortions, a benevolent government might hope to
increase social welfare by appropriately distorting information communica-
tion. For instance, suppose that monopoly power or income taxes make labor
supply sub-optimal. If the government knows that the economy is hitting a
recession and does not reveal such information, it may hope that the increase
in labor supply caused by ignorance compensates the under-supply of labor
provoked by the existence of distortions.
If individuals mechanically believe its announcements (if they are cred-
ulous), the government may even be able to restore the first best outcome
through an appropriately over-optimistic communication strategy. However,
if individuals are rational, this misleading information about a recession will
make the government lose credibility. In particular, when the economy is
hitting a boom and the government announces it, individuals will discount
such announcement. This, in turn, will further worsen the under-supply of
labor in booms, and thus reduce social welfare in good times.
1See Romer and Romer (2000); Kurz (2005); Kohn and Sack (2004); Athey et al. (2005).
2See Oh and Waldman (1990); Rodr´ıguez Mora and Schulstald (2007).
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In recessions, by hiding information, the government raises labor supply,
relative to what it would be under perfect information, so that it may (at least
partially) compensate for the welfare loss caused by the existing distortion.
Yet, it may also raise labor supply so much, that it indeed causes an over-
supply of labor (relative to the first best), whose welfare costs are higher
than those due to the distortion under perfect information. The higher the
distortion, the less likely it is that this happens. Thus, roughly, high levels
of distortion would induce the government to hide negative information.
We start by making our essential point in an abstract model with dis-
tortions, in which a benevolent social planner has private information on
productivity shocks and sends payoff-irrelevant messages to uninformed in-
dividuals. We characterize the equilibria of this cheap talk game. We find
that non informative equilibria always exist, whereas an informative (sepa-
rating) equilibrium exists if and only if distortions are sufficiently small. This
analysis extends the standard cheap-talk game (Crawford and Sobel, 1982)
to a context where there is a continuum of heterogeneous receivers, each with
a continuum of actions.3
Transparency allows individuals to react to different information in differ-
ent states of the world. Opaqueness in turn makes their actions more stable,
since different states of the world belong to the same information set. We
show that transparency is Pareto optimal, from an ex ante point of view, if
and only if full-information social welfare satisfies an appropriate convexity
condition in productivity shocks. If this condition is satisfied, our results
imply that, even with a benevolent social planner, opaqueness may be an
equilibrium although transparency is ex ante desirable.
We next extend the abstract model and focus on two specific sources of
distortions: monopoly power and income taxation. This extension shows the
direct relevance of the mechanism we analyze in standard macroeconomic
and public economics models.
In the monopoly power model, we again show that a non informative
equilibrium always exists, whereas existence of an informative equilibrium
requires that the monopolistic distortion is sufficiently small (in which case
transparency is the most natural prediction). The model shows that an
3Farrell and Gibbons (1989) extend Crawford and Sobel (1982) to two audiences. They
show that in what they call a ‘coherent game’, the sender prefers separating to pooling, ex
post and therefore also ex ante. This is not true in our model. In this sense, our analysis
also yields some insights of technical interest for game theorists, since it shows that this
result critically hinges on the two-action assumption and doe not generalize.
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increase in average productivity harms transparency, whereas an increase in
shock magnitude favors transparency, at least when shocks are small. Thus,
ceteris paribus, countries with more competitive product markets and larger
shocks are more likely to have a truthful government, whereas there is no
presumption that economic development per se brings about transparency.
In the taxation model, results on existence, efficiency and equilibrium
selection parallel those of the monopoly power model. Again, an increase in
shock magnitude favors transparency, at least when shocks are small. Hence,
ceteris paribus, countries with lower taxation and higher shocks are more
likely to have a truthful government. The main novelty in the context of
income taxation is that it is a natural environment to study the effects of
labor income inequality on transparency. We show that such effects depend
on labor supply elasticity. If labor supply is rigid, an increase in inequality
favors transparency and the opposite if it is elastic (only with linear labor
supply inequality does not affect transparency).
Both in the monopoly power and in the taxation model, transparency is
ex ante desirable (since the convexity condition of social welfare in shocks is
satisfied), but may not be feasible in equilibrium, because even a benevolent
government may want to hide negative information.
Our results are first of all related to the recent literature on the welfare
effects of information. In an influential paper, Morris and Shin (2002) show
that noisy public information, if used to coordinate actions, may lead indi-
viduals to disregard alternative valuable private information, so that more
precise public information may reduce welfare.4 Angeletos and Pavan (2007)
clarify that this result, and more generally the welfare effects of public in-
formation in an abstract class of linear-quadratic games with heterogeneous
information, depend on whether the equilibrium degree of coordination is
inefficiently high or low. While we abstract from both heterogeneous infor-
mation and from strategic complementarity or substitutability (we simply
assume that the equilibrium degree of coordination is zero), this is done in
order to focus on a different question, which has remained unexplored in this
4This reasoning has been used to warn against Central Bank transparency (Amato et al.,
2002), a conclusion that has been disputed in a lively recent debate, developed both in the
abstract context of ‘beauty contest’ models (Svensson, 2006; Morris et al., 2006; James
and Lawler, 2011) and in the applied context of New Keynesian models (Woodford, 2003;
Hellwig, 2005; Roca, 2010). Amador and Weill (2010) emphasize that public information
may slow social learning, as it jeopardizes the price system’s ability to aggregate and
transmit private information, and that it may thus result in welfare losses.
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literature, namely whether a benevolent social planner has ex post incentives
to reveal its information, even when it would be ex ante efficient to do so.
The main novelty of our contribution is therefore to show that, in economies
in which transparency is ex ante optimal, it may not arise in equilibrium
because, when distortions are large, even a benevolent social planner would
find revealing bad news ex post sub-optimal.
The importance of transparency for economic policy, and in particular
for monetary policy, has long been recognized and has been a recurrent
theme of theoretical, empirical and policy debates. Besides the virtues of
central bank’s transparency, its limits have also received substantial atten-
tion. Two prominent examples are Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Stein
(1989), who consider central bank’s private information on its own policy
preferences and highlight the advantages of ambiguity and imprecise com-
munication (the latter within a cheap talk game).5 We differ from this line
of research in that we emphasize real rather than monetary channels and
assume private information about the macroeconomic outlook rather than
about policy goals. Perhaps more importantly, we abstract from information
precision to focus on the role of economic distortions in determining whether
equilibrium communication is transparent or not.
The two extensions of the abstract model are also related to the specific
literature on information in models of business cycle and of public and po-
litical economy. We share the focus on information about real rather than
monetary shocks in a business cycle context with Angeletos and La’O (2009),
but their analysis concerns the role of information dispersion. More closely
related to our work is Angeletos et al. (2011), who show that, in the context
of a DSGE model with dispersed information, more precise public informa-
tion raises welfare if the business cycle is driven by technology or preference
shocks (as in the present paper), but not necessarily if it is driven by shocks
to monopoly markups or to labor wedges. Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009, 2011)
show that transparency may generate economic distortions (wasteful spend-
ing of inefficient public debt) if voters are misinformed about government
spending and revenues. We tackle the complementary question and show
how transparency is endogenously determined by pre-existing distortions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2, 3 and 4
5See Cukierman (2009) and Blinder et al. (2008) for a recent assessment of the limits to
central bank’s transparency and for a review of the literature on central bank’s communi-
cation.
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display the abstract model and the two extensions to monopoly power and
to income taxation, respectively. Section 5 presents a concluding discussion.
The Online Appendix contains technical results for the two applied models.
2 Transparency and distortions
In this section we shall abstract from the origin of the distortion in the
allocation of resources. The distortion will be considered exogenous and
affecting individual payoffs via individual choices. In the following sections
we shall extend the analysis of two specific cases of distortion. This will
permit to examine the link between the origin of the distortion and the
government’s information policy.
2.1 The economy
Consider an economy with a mass one of identical individuals, who make
simultaneous choices. Individual i ∈ [0, 1] chooses an action `i ≥ 0 and
obtains payoff u(`i, L, λ, θ), where L =
∫ 1
0
`i di is the average (or aggregate)
action in the population, λ ≥ 0 is a parameter capturing distortions and θ
is a random variable (the state of the world), which affects the productivity
of individual actions. Using subscript numbers to denote a function’s partial
derivatives, we make the following assumptions on u(`i, L, λ, θ), which are
assumed to hold on the entire domain, unless otherwise specified.
1. The individual problem has an interior maximum:
u11 < 0 and ∀L, λ, θ, ∃` > 0 : u1(`, L, λ, θ) = 0.
2. There are positive externalities: u2 ≥ 0, with equality only for λ = 0.
3. There is strategic independence: u12 = 0.
4. The social planner’s problem has an interior maximum:
u11 + u22 < 0 and ∀λ, θ, ∃` > 0 : u1(`, `, λ, θ) = 0.
5. λ strengthens externalities and reduces actions, but does not affect the
social optimum: u23 = −u13 > 0.
6. The exogenous state θ is beneficial through own actions and externali-
ties: u4(`, L, λ, θ) > 0 if either ` > 0 or L > 0 and λ > 0.
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7. θ boosts individual actions and makes externalities stronger:
u14 > 0 and u24 ≥ 0, with equality only for λ = 0.
8. Given actions (and λ), θ has a linear effect on the payoff: u44 = 0.
Assumptions 1 and 4 are straightforward. Assumption 2 introduces dis-
tortions in the form of positive externalities. Assumption 3 rules out strate-
gic complementarity, which is the mechanism emphasized by Morris and Shin
(2002) and others. Assumption 5 makes λ a measure of the strength of ex-
ternalities, but it makes the (Benthamite) social optimum independent of λ.
This property makes sense under Assumption 3, for instance in models in
which externalities arise from distribution rather than from production.6 In
such cases, stronger externalities raise the under-provision of effort (relative
to the social optimum) at a decentralized solution, but do not affect the
socially efficient allocation of effort. Assumption 6 conditions the beneficial
effect of the exogenous state θ to the presence of a positive level of either
own actions or externalities from other people’s actions. A reasonable inter-
pretation, which is consistent with all the models developed in this paper,
is that θ represents an aggregate productivity shock. Under this interpreta-
tion, Assumption 7 becomes natural, as it states that a higher productivity
stimulates individual activity and also reinforces the externalities from other
people’s activity. Finally, Assumption 8 makes the direct effect of θ (given ac-
tions and λ) linear. This is consistent with a linear technology with additive
productivity shocks, as in the models in the next sections, and it simplifies
the analysis.
Under perfect information on θ, each individual i would choose `∗(λ, θ) =
argmax` u(`, L, λ, θ), determined by the first order condition u1(`, L, λ, θ) = 0
and satisfying `∗λ < 0 and `
∗
θ > 0 and `
∗
L = 0.
7 A benevolent social planner
with a utilitarian welfare function would choose for each individual the same
action ˆ`(θ) by solving max{`i:i∈[0,1]}
∫ 1
0
u(`i, L, λ, θ) di, which yields the FOC
system u1(`i, L, λ, θ)+
∫ 1
0
u2(`j, L, λ, θ) dj = 0 for all i ∈ [0, 1]. Given u12 = 0,
6Two examples are the standard models considered in the next sections, in which external-
ities arise from the distribution of either profits or tax revenues. In models with strategic
complementarity, by contrast, Assumption 5 would not generally hold. To avoid future
confusion, we anticipate that in the model of Section 3 Assumption 3 holds as referred to
labor supply choices, which are the only ones made under uncertainty. The existence of
strategic complementarity in price setting in that model does not play a relevant role.
7We use subscript letters instead of numbers to denote partial derivatives whenever this
facilitates reading and does not create confusion.
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this can be written as u1(`i, L, λ, θ) + u2(`i, L, λ, θ) = 0 for all i ∈ [0, 1],
which has a symmetric solution solving u1(`, `, λ, θ) + u2(`, `, λ, θ) = 0, and
satisfying ˆ`θ > 0 and ˆ`λ = 0. Notice that for any λ > 0, `
∗(λ, θ) < `∗(0, θ) =
ˆ`(θ), so that λ introduces a downward distortion in actions relative to the
social optimum.
2.2 The Announcements Game
We investigate what happens when the social planner knows the realization
of θ, whereas individuals are not perfectly informed about it, and have to
decide on the basis of beliefs, which in turn may be influenced by the planner’s
announcements. Specifically, we assume that information is as follows. First
Nature draws θ from the following distribution, which is common knowledge:
θ =
{
ϑ , with probability p
−ϑ , with probability (1− p) , (1)
with ϑ > 0 and p ∈ (0, 1).8 The planner observes the realization of θ and
then chooses a (payoff irrelevant) message m from a set of feasible messages
{M,N}. Individuals observe m, but not θ, and then simultaneously choose
their actions to maximise expected payoff.
We consider a signaling equilibrium of this cheap talk game, with the ad-
ditional but natural requirement that out of equilibrium beliefs are the same
for everybody. Thus, a pure strategy equilibrium consists of: (i) a message
function m(θ) mapping realizations of the random shock into messages, such
that the planner’s objective (ex-post social welfare) is maximized, given in-
dividual strategies; (ii) posterior beliefs Pr(ϑ|m), which map each message
into a subjective probability about the realization of the random variable,
and which are derived from messaging strategies through Bayes’ rule along
the equilibrium path of play (and are the same for everybody following out-of-
equilibrium messages); and (iii) individual strategies s(m) mapping messages
into actions, which maximize individual expected payoff, given posterior be-
liefs (and other individuals’ strategies).9
8In this and in the following sections, the parameter ϑ can be interpreted as the amplitude
of the cycle, which is assumed symmetric for analytical simplicity.
9The mixed strategy extension is immediate.
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2.3 Equilibrium with generic distortions
Some notation will be useful throughout the paper. Let µ = Pr(θ = ϑ|m =
M) and ν = Pr(θ = ϑ|m = N) describe individual posterior beliefs (for
which we also use the notation Pr(ϑ|m), for m = M,N). Let E(x(θ)|m) =
Pr(ϑ|m)x(ϑ) + [1 − Pr(ϑ|m)]x(−ϑ) denote the expected value of a generic
function x(θ), when expectations are based on posterior beliefs after re-
ceiving message m = M,N . And let x¯(θ) = px(ϑ) + (1 − p)x(−ϑ) de-
note its ex ante expected value, when expectations are based on prior be-
liefs.10 Finally, let λ∗(µ, ν) be the solution by λ of u(`∗(M), `∗(M), λ,−ϑ) =
u(`∗(N), `∗(N), λ,−ϑ), defined for µ 6= ν, where `∗(m) is each individual’s
best response to message m = M,N .
The next proposition characterizes pure strategy equilibria (mixed strat-
egy equilibria are characterized in footnote 12 and are not very insightful).
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium with generic distortions)
An equilibrium in pure strategies always exists. Given µ and ν, individual
strategies are `∗(m) = argmax`E(u(`, L, λ, θ)|m), for m = M,N . There are
two possible types of pure strategy equilibrium.
• At a pooling equilibrium m∗(ϑ) = m∗(−ϑ) = N and µ ≤ ν = p. A
pooling equilibrium always exists.
• At a separating equilibrium m∗(−ϑ) = M, m∗(ϑ) = N, µ = 0 and
ν = 1. A separating equilibrium exists if and only if λ ≤ λ∗(0, 1).
Proof The proof consists of three steps: (i) given posterior beliefs, we
determine individual best responses to the planner’s messages, `∗(m); (ii) we
determine the planner’s best response to individual strategies in each state of
the world, m∗(θ); (iii) we impose that posterior beliefs are obtained through
Bayes’ rule along the equilibrium path of play.
1. Given µ and ν, `∗(M) is the solution by ` of µu1(`, L, λ, ϑ) + (1 −
µ)u1(`, L, λ,−ϑ) = 0 and analogously, with ν in place of µ, for `∗(N).
Notice that L is immaterial to individual choices. Individual strategies
`∗(m) satisfy `∗λ(m) < 0, for m = M,N , and `
∗
µ(M) > 0 and `
∗
ν(N) > 0.
10So expected utility after m = M is E(u(`, L, λ, θ)|M) = µu(`, L, λ, ϑ) + (1 −
µ)u(`, L, λ,−ϑ) and analogously for E(u|N).
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2. m∗(θ) = argmaxm∈{M,N} u(`
∗(m), `∗(m), λ, θ). The planner is indiffer-
ent (and can thus randomize with any probability) between the two
messages if µ = ν. If µ 6= ν, consider without loss of generality the
case of µ < ν.
In the good state, m∗(ϑ) = N . This is due to `∗(M) < `∗(N) ≤ ˆ`(ϑ),
with the last inequality strict for λ > 0, and to u1(`, L, λ, ϑ) > 0 for
` < ˆ`(ϑ).
In the bad state, for any µ and ν such that 0 ≤ µ < ν ≤ 1, there exists a
unique λ∗(µ, ν) > 0, such that m∗(−ϑ) = M if λ < λ∗(µ, ν), m∗(−ϑ) =
N if λ > λ∗(µ, ν) and the planner is indifferent between M and N if
λ = λ∗(µ, ν). To see this, let W (`, λ,−ϑ) = u(`, `, λ,−ϑ) and notice
that it is a continuous and inverted-U shaped function of ` and that its
point of maximum, ˆ`(−ϑ), is independent of λ. The planner compares
W (`∗(M), λ,−ϑ) with W (`∗(N), λ,−ϑ). Since `∗(m) is strictly increas-
ing in the posterior belief Pr(ϑ|m), we have that `∗(m) ∈ [`0(λ), `1(λ)],
where `0(λ) = `∗(m) for Pr(ϑ|m) = 0 and `1(λ) = `∗(m) for Pr(ϑ|m) =
1, for m = M,N . Moreover, since `∗(m) is strictly decreasing in λ, the
same is true for `0(λ) and `1(λ). For λ = 0, we have `0(0) = ˆ`(−ϑ),
so that ∀µ, ν : 0 ≤ µ < ν ≤ 1, W (`∗(M), 0,−ϑ) > W (`∗(N), 0,−ϑ).
For λ large enough, we have that eventually `1(λ) ≤ ˆ`(−ϑ) (to see
this, notice that u1(`
1(λ), `1(λ), λ,−ϑ) + u2(`1(λ), `1(λ), λ,−ϑ) > 0,
because both terms are strictly positive), so that ∀µ, ν : 0 ≤ µ < ν ≤
1, W (`∗(M), λ,−ϑ) < W (`∗(N), λ,−ϑ). The result is then proven by
observing that, given any µ, ν : 0 ≤ µ < ν ≤ 1, we have that for any
finite λ, `∗(M) < `∗(N), and that both `∗(M) and `∗(N) decrease con-
tinuously in λ, passing from being both above ˆ`(−ϑ) (at least weakly
for `∗(M)) when λ = 0 to being both below it (at least weakly for
`∗(N)) when λ is sufficiently large. Therefore there exists a unique
λ∗(µ, ν), such that for λ = λ∗(µ, ν), `∗(M) < ˆ`(−ϑ) < `∗(N) and
W (`∗(M), λ,−ϑ) = W (`∗(N), λ,−ϑ). And we have that λ∗(µ, ν) > 0;
that m∗(−ϑ) = M if λ < λ∗(µ, ν); that m∗(−ϑ) = N if λ > λ∗(µ, ν);
and that the planner is indifferent between M and N if λ = λ∗(µ, ν).
3. Consider a candidate pooling equilibrium. The planner sends the same
message N in both states of the world. Along the equilibrium path of
play, i.e., upon receiving N , individuals do not learn anything and have
to base decisions on their prior beliefs: Bayes’ rule implies ν = p. Then
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by the previous point, the planner does not deviate in the good state if
and only if µ ≤ p. The pooling equilibrium is babbling if µ = ν and non
babbling if µ < ν.11 If µ < p, the planner does not deviate in the bad
state if and only if λ ≥ λ∗(µ, p). In turn, if µ = ν, the planner never
deviates in the bad state. So a babbling equilibrium always exists.
Now consider a candidate separating equilibrium. The planner an-
nounces N in the good state and M in the bad state. Bayes’ rule then
implies µ = 0 and ν = 1. Given this, the planner never deviates in the
good state. It does not deviate in the bad state either, if and only if
λ ≤ λ∗(0, 1).12
Proposition 1 shows that there always exists an equilibrium in which the
planner is non informative. Furthermore, a transparent equilibrium in which
the planner reveals its private information also exists if and only if distortions
are sufficiently small. If distortions are large, and thus individual actions are
seriously downward distorted with respect to the social optimum, a benevo-
lent planner has a strong incentive to hide bad news, and this disrupts the
possibility that in equilibrium it is transparent.
11A babbling equilibrium is an equilibrium in which individual strategies disregard the
planner’s announcement, and the planner’s signaling strategy disregards the realization of
the shock. The only difference between babbling and non babbling pooling equilibria is in
terms of out of equilibrium beliefs.
12There are only two possible types of mixed strategy equilibria: (i) babbling equilibria, in
which the planner randomizes with any Pr(m(−ϑ) = N) = Pr(m(ϑ) = N) = ρ ∈ (0, 1)
and µ = ν = p; and (ii) semi-separating equilibria, in which m(ϑ) = N and the planner
randomizes in bad times with some Pr(m(−ϑ) = N) = ρ ∈ (0, 1), with posterior beliefs
µ = 0 and ν = pp+(1−p)ρ . Mixed strategies babbling equilibria always exist. A semi-
separating equilibrium exists if and only if λ = λ∗
(
0, pp+(1−p)ρ
)
. To see this, notice
that in the good state the planner is willing to mix if and only if µ = ν, which is only
compatible with babbling equilibria. So, without loss of generality, non babbling equilibria
in mixed strategies imply µ < ν and m(ϑ) = N , i.e., they may only be semi-separating.
For ρ ∈ {0, 1}, we have the two pure strategy equilibria considered above. For ρ ∈ (0, 1),
Bayes’ rule implies µ = 0 and ν = pp+(1−p)ρ . Given this, the planner does not deviate in the
good state. It does not deviate in the bad state either, if and only if λ = λ∗
(
0, pp+(1−p)ρ
)
.
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2.4 Efficiency
Let us now compare the pooling and the separating equilibria from an ex
ante point of view, that is, when averages (or expected values) are based on
the prior distribution of shocks. Let u¯S and u¯P denote the ex ante expected
levels of social welfare (equivalently, of individual payoff), at a separating
and at a pooling equilibrium, respectively.
Proposition 2 (Ex ante Pareto dominance)
The separating equilibrium ex ante Pareto dominates the pooling equilibrium
(u¯S > u¯P ), if and only if equilibrium payoff under perfect information is a
convex function of the random variable θ.
Proof Let uS(θ) and uP (θ) be social welfare at a separating and at
a pooling equilibrium, respectively, when the state of the world is θ. Let
`S(θ) be the action chosen under perfect information about the state of
the world (as it happens at a separating equilibrium), which solves by `
u1(`, L, λ, θ) = 0. Let `
P be the action chosen at a pooling equilibrium. Lin-
earity of the payoff in θ (u4 > 0 and u44 = 0) implies linearity of the marginal
payoff in θ (u14 > 0 and u144 = 0) and so it implies that `
P = `S(θ¯), since
it solves pu1(`, L, λ, ϑ) + (1 − p)u1(`, L, λ,−ϑ) = u1(`, L, λ, θ¯) = 0, where
θ¯ = pϑ + (1− p)(−ϑ). It also implies that u¯P = uS(θ¯). To see this, observe
that uS(θ¯) = u(`S(θ¯), `S(θ¯), λ, θ¯) = pu(`P , `P , λ, ϑ) + (1− p)u(`P , `P , λ,−ϑ).
Consider now the function W (θ) = u(`S(θ), `S(θ), λ, θ). We have that u¯S =
pW (ϑ)+(1−p)W (−ϑ) and u¯P = W (θ¯), so that u¯S > u¯P ⇐⇒ W ′′(θ) > 0.
Proposition 2 implies that a benevolent planner ex-ante sees transparency
as preferable to opaqueness if and only if the shocks, if publicly observed,
would have a convex effect on the equilibrium payoff. In this case, opaque-
ness would induce actions responding to the expected values of the random
variable yielding a lower payoff because of the convexity condition. Because
of the same argument, concavity would make opaqueness ex ante preferable.
2.5 Implications of the main results
We have assumed an economy subject to a distortion and that experiences
random shocks, over which the planner has private information. The planner
decides on its information policy in view to maximize social welfare. Notice
that the most preferred policy before knowing the realization of the random
12
shock might be different from the one preferred after knowing it. We assume
that the government cannot credibly commit and hence chooses the policy
that maximizes ex-post social welfare. Our results say that if the distortion
is large enough, the only equilibrium policy entails opaqueness because the
planner always finds it ex-post preferable to hide negative shocks. The con-
sequence of this is that individuals in equilibrium fully distrust the planner’s
announcements. If the distortion is small, truth-telling can be an equilib-
rium, together with opaqueness.13 However, transparency will be ex ante
seen as preferable to opaqueness if and only if, under full information, the
individual payoff is convex in the random variable. If this condition is satis-
fied, the planner would ex ante prefer to be transparent, but, if distortions
are substantial in magnitude, will be opaque in equilibrium. In this case, del-
egating information policy to a separate agency, committed to transparency,
would be beneficial, because such commitment would prevent from making
ex post a decision that ex ante is sub-optimal.
In the next sections we examine two different potential sources of distor-
tions and apply our general results to obtain the corresponding equilibrium
information policy. This allows to show both how the basic mechanism works
in standard economic contexts and what new insights it provides.
3 Transparency and monopoly power
In the first extension of the abstract model we consider an economy with a
monopolistic distortion. The model is a simplified version of the canonical
RBC model with no capital and a continuum of differentiated goods. To focus
on the information analysis, we abstract from dynamic considerations.14
3.1 The economy and the announcements game
There is a mass one of identical individuals, who work, consume and own
shares of a mass one of firms, each producing a different variety of a con-
sumption good. Utility depends on consumption and labor:
13Note that this result has a clear “second best” flavor. Hiding information is in itself a
distortion, relative to full information. However, given the presence of other distortions in
the economy, it may well be that this additional distortion ends up increasing aggregate
welfare.
14See, e.g., Angeletos and La’O (2009). Relative to their analysis, we also abstract from
dispersed information (as we did in our abstract model).
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u(c, `) = c− `
δ
δ
, (2)
where c is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator c =
(∫ 1
0
c
σ−1
σ
i di
) σ
σ−1
, ci represents
consumption of variety i, the parameter σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties and the parameter δ > 1 captures the degree of
convexity of labor supply, which is linear in the wage for δ = 2, strictly
convex for δ ∈ (1, 2) and strictly concave for δ > 2. Firms produce with
an identical linear technology: by using `i units of labor, firm i produces
yi = A`i units of its variety of good. Labor productivity is A = A˜ + θ, so
it is the same for every firm, but it depends on two factors: the observable
component A˜ > 0 and the ex-ante unobservable component θ (say, being in
a boom or in recession), distributed according to (1). We assume ϑ ∈ (0, A˜)
to assure that productivity is always positive.15
Under perfect information on θ, the equilibrium of this economy is very
simple. Individuals choose {ci : i ∈ [0, 1]} and ` to maximise u(c, `) under
the budget constraint
∫ 1
0
pici di = w`+ pi, taking the wage rate w, prices pi’s
and distributed profits pi as given.16 Their labor supply is ` =
(
w
P
) 1
δ−1 , where
P =
(∫ 1
0
p1−σi di
) 1
1−σ
is the aggregate price index. Their demand of good i is
ci =
(
pi
P
)−σ
c.
Each firm i sets price pi to maximise profits pii = piyi − w`i, taking
technology, demand, other firms’ prices and the wage rate as given. It thus
prices according to the mark-up rule pi =
σ
σ−1
w
A
and demands labor `i =
ci
A
. Since prices are the same for every firm, the same holds for quantities:
∀i, pi = P and ci = c. The real wage wP = σ−1σ A is below labor productivity.
Labor supply is then ` =
(
σ−1
σ
A
) 1
δ−1 , consumption is c =
(
σ−1
σ
) 1
δ−1 A
δ
δ−1 , real
profits are pi
P
= c
σ
and equilibrium utility is u(c, `) =
(
σ−1
σ
) 1
δ−1 A
δ
δ−1
(
1− σ−1
δσ
)
.
15It is immediate to extend the model to the case in which firm productivity is heteroge-
neous. We present the identical firms version for expositional simplicity, as it is sufficient
to convey the main insights.
16Here we assume that individuals are identical both in productivity and in shareholding.
We discuss the role of heterogeneous productivity in the next section. Heterogeneity in
shareholding would make no relevant changes in the present model, since it would affect
the distribution of income but not individual behavior, as individuals take distributed
profits as given.
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Taking c as the numeraire, so that P = 1, the nominal part of the economy
is also easily determined.
Three observations are in order. First, monopoly power drives a wedge
between real wage and productivity, imposing a suboptimal downward dis-
tortion in individual labor supply, relative to the (first best) social optimum,
which would require ` = A
1
δ−1 . Second, this distortion is higher, the lower
the elasticity of substitution σ. Indeed, profit distribution creates a positive
externality from labor supply, which is not taken into account by individual
choices, and (real) profits are decreasing in σ. Third, equilibrium utility is
convex in A and therefore in θ. This last observation makes planner’s trans-
parency Pareto-superior to opaqueness from an ex-ante point of view, since,
as it is easy to check, this model adds economic structure to the specification
of actions and their relation to utility, but it satisfies all the assumptions of
the previous one.
Consider now imperfect information, with the following structure. First,
Nature draws θ from distribution (1), which is common knowledge. Second,
the planner observes the realization of θ and then chooses a (payoff irrel-
evant) message m ∈ {M,N} to maximize (ex post) social welfare. Third,
the labor market opens, firms demand labor, workers supply labor, and the
(expected) wage adjusts to clear the market. Firms and workers contract
on a state-contingent real wage, but employment decisions are based on ex-
pectations, since at this stage they know m but not yet θ. Fourth, once
employment is sunk, the fundamental is publicly revealed, production is
realized, and commodity prices adjust so as to clear the commodity mar-
kets (thus, prices pi’s, consumption choices ci’s, the wage rate w, and prof-
its pi are all determined under full information). Ex post social welfare is
W (θ,m) =
∫ 1
0
u(c(θ,m, `∗(m)), `∗(m)) di, where c(θ,m, `∗(m)) and `∗(m) are
the equilibrium values of consumption and labor supply.
Notice that “employment” is here a proxy for all kinds of input and
production choices that are made before the perfect realization of aggregate
uncertainty. One can thus think of this also as a proxy for investment. The
key point is that in this formulation real economic decisions are made on
the basis of incomplete information about the state of the economy. This
is different from the congenital way employment is modeled in the standard
New-Keynesian model, where it is assumed, for simplicity but not for realism,
that all employment is free to adjust to the true realized state.
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3.2 Equilibrium with monopoly power
The following proposition parallels Proposition 1. Let
xµ = E(A|M) 1δ−1 = [A˜+ (2µ− 1)ϑ] 1δ−1
xν = E(A|N) 1δ−1 = [A˜+ (2ν − 1)ϑ] 1δ−1
and, for µ 6= ν, let
σ∗(µ, ν) =
xδν − xδµ
xδν − xδµ − δ(xν − xµ)(A˜− ϑ)
. (3)
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium with monopoly power)
Given µ and ν, individuals’ strategies are
`∗(m) = E
(
w
P
|m) 1δ−1 = {(σ−1
σ
) [
A˜+ E(θ|m)
]} 1
δ−1
and
ci(θ,m, `) =
[
pi(θ,m,`)
P (θ,m,`)
]−σ
c(θ,m, `).
Firms’ strategies are pi(θ,m, `) =
σ
σ−1
w(θ,m,`)
A˜+θ
.
There are two possible types of pure strategy equilibrium.17
• At a pooling equilibrium m(ϑ) = m(−ϑ) = N and µ ≤ ν = p. A pooling
equilibrium always exists.
• At a separating equilibrium m(−ϑ) = M, m(ϑ) = N, µ = 0 and ν = 1.
A separating equilibrium exists if and only if σ ≥ σ∗(0, 1).
Proof See the Online Appendix.
3.3 Efficiency and equilibrium selection
Let us now compare the different equilibria from an ex ante point of view.
Let ¯`S, y¯S, u¯S, and ¯`P , y¯P , u¯P , denote the ex ante expected levels of labor
supply, production and indirect utility, at a separating and at a pooling equi-
librium, respectively. Independently of equilibrium existence, the following
holds.
17The structure of mixed strategy equilibria is analogous to that of the abstract model and
is not reported.
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Proposition 4 (Ex ante Pareto dominance)
For any parameter constellation, the following holds: (i) ¯`S < ¯`P ⇐⇒ δ > 2;
(ii) y¯S > y¯P ; (iii) u¯S > u¯P .
Proof See Online Appendix.
Proposition 4 establishes that, for any degree of monopoly power, trans-
parent and credible revelation of information is ex ante Pareto superior to
information hiding. This is not surprising in light of Proposition 2, since, as
noted above, full-information equilibrium utility is convex in θ.18 Yet, as we
know from Proposition 3, high monopoly power may prevent the transparent
outcome from materializing in equilibrium.19 The intuition is very simple.
Transparency allows individuals to work more when they are more produc-
tive and less when they are less productive. This unequivocally raises the ex
ante level of production (and welfare), relative to no information disclosure.
Although it also raises the ex ante level of disutility from labor (since work-
ers dislike fluctuations in labor effort), this latter effect is always more than
compensated by the higher expected level of consumption (hence the effect
on welfare).20
As in the abstract model, when distortions are not too large, i.e., here,
for σ ≥ σ∗(0, 1), both a separating and a pooling equilibrium exist. It is then
natural to ask which equilibrium is more plausible in this case.
18This is also in line with Angeletos et al. (2011), since technology shocks are the source
of the business cycle. Notice that, although we assume that the source of distortions (the
elasticity of substitution in the present model as well as the tax rate in the next section)
is a-cyclical, this is not true for the wedge between first-best and full-information labor
supply, which is pro-cyclical in both models. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) show that, in
economies that are inefficient even under complete information, if this wedge positively
co-varies with full-information equilibrium strategies, then more precise public information
is (ex ante) welfare increasing. Our results are coherent with theirs.
19Notice that, for any parameter constellation, ex ante expected levels of individual labor
supply, production and indirect utility, whose relationships are identified in Proposition 4,
are well defined, independently of whether a separating equilibrium exists.
20Transparency raises expected leisure time if the elasticity of labor supply is γ ≡ 1δ−1 < 1
(i.e., for δ > 2). In this case, labor supply is a concave function of expected wages. This
implies that, relative to the case of no information, labor supply reductions in recessions
are more pronounced than increases in booms. If the elasticity of labor supply is γ > 1
(i.e., for δ < 2), by contrast, labor supply is a convex function of expected wages. In this
case, transparency raises expected labor supply, relative to information hiding.
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Ex ante Pareto dominance selects the separating equilibrium whenever it
exists, but it is not (always) a good selection criterion in the present context,
because, whenever σ ∈ [σ∗(0, 1), σ∗(0, p)], planner’s preferences over equilib-
ria are reversed in different states of the world.21 It is therefore worthwhile
to look at different equilibrium refinements.
In cheap talk games, standard refinements based on Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986), which restrict off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs, have little power, be-
cause mixed strategy babbling equilibria always survive them. We consider
a recent refinement, explicitly introduced by Chen et al. (2008) to select
equilibria in cheap-talk games, called No Incentive to Separate (NITS); and
a stronger refinement, the Neologism Proof (NP) equilibrium, proposed by
Farrell (1993). In the Online Appendix we define such concepts in the context
of our model and show that, whenever it exists, the separating equilibrium
satisfies both NITS and NP. Moreover, whenever existing, it is the only NP
equilibrium.
The implication is that, for σ ≥ σ∗(0, 1), the separating equilibrium ap-
pears the most natural prediction of the game. In light of this, we conduct
the following discussion assuming that the economy coordinates on the trans-
parent equilibrium whenever it exists.
3.4 Transparency and the business cycle
One natural question is whether the amplitude of the business cycle favors
or harms transparency.22 To answer this question in the simplest way, it is
convenient to focus on the case of linear labor supply (δ = 2). In this case,
expression (3) simplifies to σ∗(0, 1) = A˜
ϑ
. If we measure the relative amplitude
of the business cycle by the ratio of shock size to structural productivity, ϑ
A˜
,
it is clear that economies subject to more pronounced business cycles have
a larger support for transparency. While this may be surprising, from the
21In booms the planner would prefer to be in a separating equilibrium, in which it reveals
its private information, thus boosting labor supply and welfare; in recessions it would
prefer to be in a pooling equilibrium, in which information is not revealed, so that labor
supply and welfare are higher than with perfect information. The proof of this claim
immediately follows from the proof of Lemma 2 in the Online Appendix, whereas the fact
that σ∗(0, p) > σ∗(0, 1) follows from Lemma 1 in the Online Appendix.
22We refer to the interval [σ∗(0, 1),∞) as to the support of transparency and say that
parameter changes favor (reduce) transparency if they decrease (increase) σ∗(0, 1). Recall
from Proposition 3 that information transparency is an equilibrium policy (indeed, the
most natural prediction of the game) for σ ≥ σ∗(0, 1) —i.e., when the distortion is “small”.
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theoretical point of view it is a direct consequence of the way in which the
support for transparency is determined, namely by the welfare comparison
that a credible planner makes between revealing or not information on a
recession. When σ = σ∗(0, 1), a credible planner is indifferent between the
two alternatives. This is because the monopolistic distortion (the underwork
caused by monopoly power under truthful revelation) is equivalent (in welfare
terms) to the information distortion (the overwork arising if the planner lies).
An increase in relative shock magnitude raises the information distortion
relative to the monopolistic distortion, and therefore raises the relative cost
of lying and expands the support for transparency. The full generalization
of this result to arbitrary parameter values proves complex, but for small
shocks it is easy to show that, for any parameter constellation (not only for
δ = 2), an increase in shock magnitude favors transparency.23 While shock
magnitude matters for transparency, shock frequency does not, because the
threshold σ∗(0, 1) is determined conditionally on being in recession.
It is also interesting to notice that our model features a fixed elasticity
of labor supply to expected wages, equal to γ = 1
δ−1 . Yet, while actual
wages do not depend on whether equilibrium information is transparent or
not, expected wages, and thus actual labor supply, do depend on the infor-
mation regime. In particular, they fluctuate over the business cycle under
transparency but not under opaqueness. As a result, the elasticity of labor
supply to actual wages over the business cycle is zero for an economy with
large monopolistic distortions and therefore opaque information, whereas it
is positive and equal to γ for an economy with the same value of δ, but
with lower monopoly power and therefore transparent information. As a
consequence, all else equal, the model predicts that income fluctuations over
the business cycle will also be more pronounced in economies with more
competitive product markets and therefore transparent rather than opaque
information. The importance of information and expectations is an aspect
that tends to be overlooked in the empirical debate on the estimates of labor
supply elasticity, which in our view deserves more attention.
23To prove this result, write σ∗(0, 1) = 11−q(0,1) as in Lemma 1 in the Online Appendix and
observe that ∂σ
∗(0,1)
∂ϑ is equal in sign to
∂q(0,1)
∂ϑ . By applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule it is easy to
obtain that limϑ→0
∂q(0,1)
∂ϑ = − 1A˜ < 0, so that
∂σ∗(0,1)
∂ϑ
∣∣
ϑ=0
< 0.
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4 Transparency, taxation and inequality
As a second extension of the abstract model, consider now an economy in
which distortions arise from taxation rather than from monopoly power. In-
come taxes push net wages below individual productivity and thus make
labor effort inefficiently low, as individuals do not internalize the externality
emerging from the redistribution of tax revenues, exactly as they did not
internalize the externality arising from the distribution of firms’ profits in
the previous model.
4.1 The economy and the announcements game
There is a mass one of individuals, who have identical preferences over a ho-
mogeneous consumption good c and over labor effort `, described by (2), but
who differ in productivity. Individuals earn competitive wages and produce
with a linear technology, so that labor income y (equivalently, production,
taken as numeraire) is simply equal to individual supply of efficiency units
of labor. Individual productivity depends on two factors: an idiosyncratic
observable component (ability or human capital), denoted β and distributed
according to the cumulative distribution function F , with support on the non
empty interval [b, B) ⊂ R+; and the aggregate, ex-ante unobservable, ran-
dom component θ (being in boom or in recession), distributed according to
(1), with ϑ ∈ (0, b) to assure that individual productivity is always positive.
Individual labor income therefore depends on effort, ability and aggregate
conditions, yβ = (β + θ)`β. Labor income is taxed at a constant marginal
rate t ∈ (0, 1) and tax revenues T = ∫ B
b
tyβdF (β) are equally redistributed,
so that individual consumption is equal to cβ = (1 − t)yβ + T . Since the
population is continuous, each individual takes T as given.24
From our assumption on preferences it is immediate to obtain that, if
individuals could observe the realization of θ before choosing their effort
level, they would choose `β = [(1− t) (β + θ)]
1
δ−1 and produce yβ = (1 −
t)
1
δ−1 (β + θ)
δ
δ−1 . Taxes impose a downward distortion in individual effort
supply, relative to the social optimum, which would require `β = (β + θ)
1
δ−1 .
24The tax collection per capita T will depend on the realization of θ. Therefore, individuals
will entertain conjectures about their value. As we shall see, because of our assumption
on individual preferences these conjectures are immaterial because they have no effect on
labor supply.
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Equilibrium social welfare under perfect information is W =
∫ B
b
uβdF (β) =(
δ−1+t
δ
)
(1 − t) 1δ−1 ∫ B
b
(β + θ)
δ
δ−1dF (β), which is convex in θ. Therefore, we
can expect transparency to be Pareto-superior to opaqueness from an ex-ante
point of view.
Consider now imperfect information. First Nature draws θ from (1). Both
F and the distribution of θ are common knowledge. The planner observes the
realization of θ and then chooses a (payoff irrelevant) message m ∈ {M,N}.
Individuals observe m, but not θ, and then simultaneously choose their labor
effort to maximize utility. Ex-post the realization of θ is observed by all
individuals, who are paid accordingly. The aim of the planner is to maximise
social welfare W =
∫ B
b
uβdF (β), where uβ denotes the utility of an individual
with ability β and depends on t, on θ, on individual labor effort `β, and on
the labor effort chosen by the entire population (since T depends on it).
The equilibrium concept and the notation on beliefs and expectations are as
above.
4.2 Equilibrium and efficiency
The main results on equilibrium and efficiency parallel those obtained above,
so we present them without discussion. In particular, Proposition 5 parallels
Propositions 1 and 3 and Proposition 6 follows Propositions 2 and 4. With
a slight abuse of notation, but in the same spirit as in Section 3, let
xµ = [β + E(θ|M)]
1
δ−1 = [β + (2µ− 1)ϑ] 1δ−1 ,
xν = [β + E(θ|N)]
1
δ−1 = [β + (2ν − 1)ϑ] 1δ−1
and, for µ 6= ν,
t∗(µ, ν) = 1−
∫ B
b
(β − ϑ)(xν − xµ) dF (β)∫ B
b
1
δ
(xδν − xδµ) dF (β)
(4)
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium with taxation and inequality)
Given µ and ν, equilibrium labor supply strategies are described by `∗β(m) =
{(1− t) [β + E(θ|m)]} 1δ−1 .
There are two possible types of pure strategy equilibrium.
• At a pooling equilibrium m(ϑ) = m(−ϑ) = N and µ ≤ ν = p. A pooling
equilibrium always exists.
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• At a separating equilibrium m(−ϑ) = M, m(ϑ) = N, µ = 0 and ν = 1.
A separating equilibrium exists if and only if t ≤ t∗(0, 1).
Proof See Online Appendix.
Let us now compare the different equilibria from an ex ante point of view.
For an individual with ability β, let ¯`Sβ , y¯
S
β , u¯
S
β , and
¯`P
β , y¯
P
β , u¯
P
β , denote the
ex ante expected levels of labor supply, production and indirect utility, at
a separating and at a pooling equilibrium, respectively. Independently of
equilibrium existence, the following results hold.
Proposition 6 (Ex ante Pareto dominance)
For any parameter constellation, any ability distribution, and any level β of
individual ability, the following holds: (i) ¯`Sβ <
¯`P
β ⇐⇒ δ > 2; (ii) y¯Sβ > y¯Pβ ;
(iii) u¯Sβ > u¯
P
β .
Proof See Online Appendix.
Results for equilibrium selection are also very close to those obtained in
the context of the monopoly power model and are discussed in the Online
Appendix. Again, the main insight is that, whenever existing, i.e., for t ≤
t∗(0, 1), the separating equilibrium appears the most natural prediction of
the game. In light of this, for the following discussion we assume that the
economy coordinates on the separating equilibrium whenever it exists.
4.3 Transparency and inequality
The main new insight provided by this model concerns the role of inequality
and its effects on transparency.25 Indeed, this is a natural environment to ask
25The effects of the amplitude of the business cycle are similar to those discussed for the
previous model and are analyzed in the Online Appendix. Moreover, the taxation model
also confirms that, all else equal, output and hours worked fluctuate more when the gov-
ernment is transparent. This is consistent with the evidence provided by Demertzis and
Hughes-Hallett (2007) and with the recently uncovered negative relationship between tax-
ation and output volatility (Debrun et al., 2008). Yet, since the government tends to
be transparent when aggregate shocks are relatively large, the ceteris paribus condition
should not be forgotten.
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whether inequality favors or harms transparency.26 In the next proposition
we use Lorenz dominance (second order stochastic dominance) as a criterion
to establish whether a distribution has more inequality than another one.
Let γ ≡ 1
δ−1 be the elasticity of labor supply.
Proposition 7 (Effects of inequality)
For any parameter constellation and distributional assumption, the effects of
skill inequality on transparency depend on labor supply elasticity. In particu-
lar, consider a shift from skill distribution F to a more unequal distribution
G, dominated by F with respect to second order stochastic dominance.
• If γ = 1, such an increase in inequality has no effects on transparency.
• If γ < 1, it favors transparency.
• If γ > 1, letting γˆ = 2
1−t∗(0,1) > 2, we have that γ ∈ (1, γˆ] is a sufficient
condition for it to reduce transparency.
Proof See Online Appendix.
First notice that most of the literature on information transparency as-
sumes γ = 1 (which means linear labor supply) and thus assumes away the
effects of inequality. Yet, the general picture is that inequality matters for
transparency and that the way it does depends on the shape of the labor
supply curve. In particular, if labor supply is rigid (i.e., for γ < 1), as most
micro-estimates suggest, inequality favors transparency. Yet, if labor supply
is elastic, as many macro models assume, inequality harms transparency.27
To grasp the intuition of this result, notice that t∗(0, 1) depends on the
welfare comparison between (credibly) revealing and not revealing informa-
tion, conditional on being in a recession.28 Relative to information hiding,
transparency in recessions raises leisure and reduces consumption for each
individual. It is therefore useful to disentangle the effects of inequality on
26Analogously to what we did in Section 3, we refer to the tax rate interval [0, t∗(0, 1)] as
to the support of transparency, and say that parameter or distributional changes favor
(reduce) transparency if they increase (decrease) t∗(0, 1).
27For evidence on labor supply elasticity see, e.g., Fiorito and Zanella (2012).
28The relative social welfare gain to transparency in recessions depends on the tax rate: it
is positive for low tax distortions and negative in the opposite case. The formal details on
such comparison are provided in footnote 7 in the Online Appendix.
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t∗(0, 1) into those working through the consumption differential and those
working through the leisure differential between transparency and opaque-
ness.
Given the complementarity between skills and effort, an increase in skill
inequality raises mean income and therefore mean consumption, indepen-
dently of labor supply elasticity.29 Since higher consumption is what drives
the welfare advantage to opaqueness over transparency, by raising aggregate
consumption, inequality favors opaqueness. Yet, utility depends on leisure
besides on consumption, and the effects of inequality on leisure are more
interesting.
In our model labor supply is concave (in wage or ability) whenever it is
rigid (γ < 1). With rigid labor supply, an increase in skill inequality therefore
raises aggregate leisure time. Since higher leisure is what drives the welfare
advantage to transparency over opaqueness, by raising aggregate leisure, in-
equality favors transparency. Thus, under rigid labor supply, the two welfare
effects of inequality, through consumption and through leisure, work in oppo-
site directions: one favors opaqueness and the other one transparency. The
overall effect depends on which force dominates. What we show is that, with
rigid labor supply, the leisure channel dominates and skill inequality indeed
favors transparency.
In contrast, with elastic (and therefore convex in ability) labor supply
(γ > 1), an increase in skill inequality raises aggregate labor time and thus,
besides increasing aggregate consumption, it reduces aggregate leisure. Both
effects now work in the same direction, making skill inequality favor opaque-
ness.
To the extent that inequality generates higher tax rates and therefore
higher distortions, it may also have an indirect effect on transparency. To
explore this mechanism, in Albornoz et al. (2009) we provide a political econ-
omy extension of the analysis, in which taxes are chosen by majority voting
along the lines of Meltzer and Richard (1981).30 The impact of inequality
then results from the combination of two effects. On the one hand, higher
29While at first sight surprising, the fact that skill inequality is welfare increasing is a
direct consequence of the above mentioned complementarity, paired with a Benthamite
social welfare function.
30We look at a politico-economic Nash equilibrium, in which the tax rate (chosen by ma-
jority voting) and the informational policy (chosen by the government) are mutually con-
sistent. Notice that, given the assumptions of the model, if a benevolent government were
completely free to set the tax rate, it would set it equal to zero.
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inequality induces the median voter to choose a higher tax rate. This in itself
reduces the scope for transparency. On the other hand, for any given tax
rate, the way in which higher inequality changes the government’s valuation
of truth-telling (in recessions) depends on the elasticity of labor supply, as
discussed in Proposition 7. If labor supply is elastic, an increase in inequality
amplifies the distortion created by taxation and thus raises the incentive to
hide bad news. In this case, the two channels move in the same direction
and inequality harms transparency. However, if labor supply is inelastic, an
increase in inequality reduces the magnitude of the tax distortion and thus
raises the incentive to transparently reveal bad news. Now the two chan-
nels work in opposite directions and the net effect cannot be established in
general.31
5 Concluding discussion
This paper investigates how government transparency depends on economic
distortions. Distortions drive a wedge between the social optimum and the
full-information equilibrium. As a consequence, a benevolent government,
with welfare-relevant private information, has an incentive to manipulate
communication.
If distortions are high, transparency cannot emerge in equilibrium, even
when it is ex ante desirable. If distortions are also hard to remove, the policy
implication is that the government should find some commitment device to
transparency. For instance, announcements over the economic outlook might
be delegated to an independent statistical office, committed to transparency.
Our results suggest that, all else equal, we should expect a negative re-
lationship between government transparency and economic distortions. We
are not aware of any empirical investigation of the impact of distortions on
government transparency. Yet, in the cross-section of countries, there is a
strong negative correlation between measures of fiscal transparency and mea-
sures of distortions.32 While this correlation may reflect the joint effect of
31Focusing on the case of a unit elasticity of labor supply, we show that, if the size of
the shock is larger than a threshold level, the equilibrium is informative for all levels
of inequality; but below this threshold, inequality harms transparency. Specifically, the
equilibrium is informative for low inequality, uninformative for high inequality, whereas
both an informative and an uninformative equilibrium exist for intermediate levels.
32For instance, this holds when fiscal transparency is measured by the “Open Budget Index”
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political institutions on these variables, our theory suggests that causality
may also run from distortions directly to the level of transparency. An open
direction for future research is to explore this possibility in the data.
Our theory highlights the limits of equilibrium transparency when the
government is benevolent, individuals are rational and no credible commit-
ment is possible. We leave the analysis of transparency outside these assump-
tions for future investigation.33 Within our framework, it is worth noting that
precisely when the government ‘lies’ (in the sense that, in recessions, it sends
the same message it sends in booms), individuals are ex post happy that it
‘lied’. Therefore, the fact that the government’s private information is ex
post verifiable is not problematic. Moreover, the fact that we restrict to two
elements both the state and message space polarizes equilibria on either full
revelation or no revelation at all. An extension to the continuum case would
generate equilibria with partial revelation and would thus allow to study the
degree of information precision, but it would not affect the main intuition
and the main results.34
Perhaps the most interesting extensions of the present framework con-
cern the various possible forms of interaction between economic distortions
and transparency. First, while we assumed that the driver of the business
cycle, on which the government has private information, is a productivity
shock, one might also imagine that the government’s private information
concerns shocks to monopoly mark-ups or to labor wedges, as in Angeletos
et al. (2011). This might change our results and make opaqueness ex ante
desirable. Second, we have assumed that distortions are persistent and the
government cannot directly eliminate them. The investigation of the political
economy reasons behind this difficulty is a promising research avenue. For
instance, an elected government might be influenced by lobbying activity or
by a demand for redistribution. In Albornoz et al. (2009) we explore this last
(developed by the International Budget Partnership), and distortions by the “Time to Start
Business” or the “Ease of Doing Business” (which capture barriers to entry and obstacles
to business activity, both provided by the World Bank), or by several measures of taxes
(such as top marginal tax rate on labor income, taxes on goods and taxes on international
trade, obtained by the OECD World Tax Indicators).
33For instance, an incumbent government might want to be over-optimistic in order to
influence individuals’ beliefs on its ability, beyond the motives emphasized in this paper.
While this would provide an extra incentive to hide bad news, we expect that it would not
change our main results.
34This can be seen most clearly in Albornoz et al. (2009), where mixed strategies allow for
a semi-separating equilibrium.
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possibility and show that inequality harms transparency because it generates
higher taxes. This modifies the results obtained in section 4 above, where we
show how the effects of inequality on transparency depend on labor supply
elasticity. Third, we have assumed that the government influences individual
choices only through its informational policy, but how the latter interacts
with monetary and fiscal policy is certainly worth investigating, since the
direction and size of the shock may well depend on policy actions. Fourth,
while we have assumed that the government perfectly observes the shock
and that individuals have no other source of information, a natural exten-
sion would be to look at government incentives to put a privately observed
noisy signal of the shock in the public domain, when individuals also have
dispersed and noisy information. These lines of research remain open.
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